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Abstract 
The phenomenal success of China’s market-oriented economic reform since the 1980s has 
rendered the traditional employment-based social security system increasingly inadequate and 
inefficient. Based on the re-structuring of the social insurance programmes, welfare reforms 
have left an increasing number of people outside the emerging social protection system. 
Mounting unemployment and urban poverty are threatening social stability, which calls for 
prompt and effective government intervention. Against this background, the development of a 
residual social assistance programme has become paramount. This article outlines the 
development of the China’s social assistance programme, including its design, implementation 
and trends. The Chinese government has given high priority to the establishment and 
institutionalisation of this programme. To have an effective social assistance programme in the 
context of an increasingly pluralistic society, China is facing the profoundly challenging task of 
designing a coherent and over-arching social protection system that would cover retirement, 
medical care, unemployment, and poverty alleviation. 
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Introduction 
As an integral part of the social protection system, social assistance programmes in different 
countries may embrace a wide range of services in kind and in cash. Primarily, social assistance 
is a means-tested scheme where eligibility is dependent on the test of income (Gough, 
Bradshaw, Ditch, Eardley & Whiteford, 1997). Financed mainly by public funds, social 
assistance programmes have received growing attention from governments and social policy 
analysts in recent years in developed welfare states (Ditch, 1999; Ditch, Bradshaw, Clasen, 
Huby & Moodie, 1997; Ditch & Oldfields, 1999; Eardley, Bradshaw, Ditch, Gough & 
Whiteford., 1996ab; Mackay, 2001; OECD, 1998ab, 1999; Sainsbury, 1996; Saraceno, 2002), 
in developing countries (Lustig & Inter-American Development Bank, 2001; Subbarao et al., 
1997; Wilson, Kanji & Braathen, 2001) and in transition countries (Braithwaite, Grootaert & 
Milanović, 2000; Hutton & Redmond, 2000; Mikhalev, 2001; Milanović, 1998). The 1997 
Asian financial crisis underscored the need for more institutionalised social assistance policies 
and programmes for people facing the risk of unemployment and poverty (Oritz, 2000, 2002). 
Facing escalating demands, most social assistance programmes have to be re-structured to 
target those in need, to improve efficiency, contain rising costs and promote work requirements. 
China has enjoyed almost uninterrupted economic growth at an average rate of 9 per cent a 
year since the initiation of the market reforms in the 1980s, and the country is expected to 
maintain an annual growth rate of 7-8 per cent in the coming decade (9.1 per cent in 2003) (The 
Economist, 20 March, 2004). The phenomenal success of China’s market-oriented economic 
reforms has been accompanied by a wide array of social problems. Economic reforms in 
state-owned enterprises (SOEs) have rendered the traditional work unit-based social security 
system increasingly inadequate and inefficient. For two decades, the Chinese government has 
been trying to develop a more pluralistic, independent, effective and affordable social security 
system that will be compatible with both a thriving market economy and a flagging socialist 
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political structure. Social security reform centres on the establishment of partially funded 
systems in retirement, unemployment and medical insurance that move away from the current 
pay-as-you-go systems, and the development of a basic social assistance programme covering 
all urban residents (Leung, 2003). Indeed, an effective social security system would not only 
facilitate economic reforms by promoting productivity, but also enhance social harmony 
through the mitigation of social tensions and conflicts (Information Office, State Council, April 
2002, September 2004). 
In his annual government report to the National People’s Congress in 2002, the former 
Chinese Premier Zhu Rongji, for the first time in history, used the term ‘vulnerable populations’ 
to refer to those disadvantaged groups outside the traditional employment-based social 
protection system. They include the unemployed, rural migrants working in the cities and 
low-income families (Zheng, 2003). New Chinese leaders continued to reiterate the 
government’s commitment to help the poor and reduce regional disparities (People’s Daily, 26 
May 2004). Facing the problem of mounting unemployment and the inadequacy of the 
contributory social insurance programmes in both coverage and income protection, the Chinese 
government has, since the late 1990s, put greater emphasis on the development and 
institutionalisation of the means-tested social assistance programme. This programme has 
grown dramatically in recent years in terms of expenditures and the number of recipients. In 
moving towards a socialist market economy, the programme acts as a ‘safety net’ for the urban 
poverty-stricken residents and a ‘shock absorber’ mitigating social tensions resulting from 
market-oriented reforms. Under the government pledges of the ‘two guarantees’ and ‘three 
social protection lines’, the social assistance programme has emerged as  the foremost 
component of the Chinese social protection system, independent from the work units.1  
                                                 
1 The ‘two guarantees’ refer to payments of living allowances to laid-off employees and pensions to retirees. ‘The 
three social protection lines’ refer to three programmes, namely social assistance, unemployment insurance and 
living allowance for laid-off employees. 
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This article presents the background and the development of the social assistance 
programme, including the design, implementation and recipient profile. The shortcomings and 
achievements of the programme are appraised. Towards the end of the article, the implications 
of the programme to the establishment of a more coherent social welfare system in China are 
explored. 
   
Rising unemployment and poverty 
Immediately after 1949, the Chinese government provided a mixture of assistance including 
cash assistance, mutual help through material and money donations, promotion of 
neighbourhood-based economic production groups and reduction of taxes to assist the 
unemployed and poverty-stricken. Under the centrally-planned economy modelled on that of 
the Soviet Union, the system of public ownership, full and life-long employment, job creation 
and assignment, and restricted labour mobility was regarded as a superior feature of socialism. 
Since social security was employment-centred, each work unit functioned as a self-sufficient 
‘welfare society’ within which an individual received employment and income protection, and 
enjoyed heavily subsidised benefits and services such as housing, food and education (Leung, 
1994; Leung, 2003; Leung & Nann, 1995; Walder, 1986). Under the socialist system, the role of 
the government in welfare was limited to providing support for the ‘three nos’ – those with no 
families, no working ability and no source of income. These included mainly childless frail 
older persons, the disabled homeless and orphans. The size of this population was small, and 
the problem of urban poverty was therefore limited. As a very egalitarian society, the Gini 
Coefficient in cities in 1978 was only 0.19 (Khan & Riskin, 2001).  
From the start of the 1980s, the ‘iron rice bowl’ began to be regarded as impeding 
economic efficiency, labour mobility and productivity by acting as a disincentive. The 
government was aware that a re-structuring of the social security system would be an 
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indispensable part of the whole process of market-oriented economic reform.2 With the 
emergence of a more pluralistic economy and employment structure after the economic reforms, 
more urban employees have been left outside the traditional social security network provided 
by the SOEs. In 2003, only 26.8 per cent of urban employees worked in SOEs, compared with 
76.2 per cent in 1980 (China Internet Information Centre, 2004).  
By the end of 2003, the official urban unemployment rate was 4.3 per cent, representing 
eight million people. But Chinese economists estimated that the actual rate was double or triple 
the official rate (China Daily, 23 December 2003).3  From 1998 to 2003, the accumulative total 
number of employees laid off from SOEs was 28.18 million (six million layoffs in 2003). The 
laid-off employees were mainly around 40-50 years old, poorly educated and low skilled, and 
constituted a high proportion of female employees. Their opportunity for re-employment is dim. 
In addition, there are around 10 million new entrants into the job market each year, while the 
number of jobs created each year is only around nine million. The situation is further 
aggravated by the 100 million surplus workers in the rural areas intending to move into cities 
for jobs (Hussain, 2003; Mo, 2004; Ministry of Labour and Social Security, 2004; Information 
Office, State Council, April 2004). Even with high economic growth rates, the unemployment 
                                                 
2  Economic reforms focused on the gradual liberalisation of the economic structure and increases in the 
production and management autonomy of SOEs. The introduction of the taxation system provided an incentive for 
SOEs to make profits and enhance efficiency. In terms of employment, steps were also taken to erode the 
traditional socialist commitment of life-long employment or job security through the introduction in 1986 of 
contract work, dismissal procedures, bankruptcy law and unemployment insurance. The traditional job assignment 
system was gradually replaced by the use of the labour market by both employers and job-seekers. As a result, 
workers became liable to become unemployed as a result of dismissal, bankruptcy or termination of contract. In 
addition, the egalitarian wage system was dismantled to provide incentives for improved performance (Leung, 
1994; Leung, 2003).  
3 In China, the unemployed population includes only those who have urban household registration, are within 
working age and register at local employment offices for jobs. The laid-off employees are not regarded officially as 
unemployed because they can still maintain employment relationships with their employers, and can receive living 
allowances and social security benefits from them. 
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situation in China remains bleak. 
In the early 1990s, laid-off employees were allowed to receive living allowances and 
social security benefits from their employers. Since 1995, re-employment service centres had 
been set up to provide basic living allowances, re-training, payment of social security 
contributions and job referrals.4 Laid-off employees could stay at the centres for a maximum of 
three years. However, the re-employment rate of these laid-off employees within a year’s time 
had been declining from over 50 per cent in 1998 to 31 per cent in 2001 (Ru, Lu & Li, 2003: 6). 
Even with government re-assurance, a small proportion of the laid-off employees could not 
receive their entitled allowances and support. In 2001, the government announced the gradual 
closure of these centres. Thereafter, new laid-off employees would have to terminate their 
employment relationship with their work units immediately and seek assistance directly from 
the unemployment insurance or the social assistance programmes.  
The unemployment insurance schemes set up in 1986 were under-utilised in the late 1980s, 
largely because of the restricted eligibility and narrow coverage. As unemployment rates rose in 
the early 1990s, the programme became a more prominent means of providing assistance to the 
unemployed. Yet with a relatively low contribution rate (3 per cent of the total wage), the fund 
evidently cannot cope with the demand from rising unemployment. Those receiving assistance 
from the programme are mainly workers whose contracts have been terminated and laid-off 
employees who have spent three years in the re-employment service centres but still cannot find 
a job. The programme offers a basic living allowance to the unemployed for a maximum period 
of two years, depending on the length of service. According to the regulations, the benefit level 
should lie between 120 and 150 per cent of the local poverty line, but in some places it is 
actually 70-80 per cent of the local minimum wage (Leung, 2003). In this sense, it is a form of 
                                                 
4 Re-employment service centres were operated by the local governments and financed by contributions from 
SOEs, unemployment insurance funds and government allocations (Leung, 2003). 
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non-means-tested and flat-rated unemployment assistance. In 2003, around 40 per cent of urban 
employees had participated in the unemployment insurance schemes, constituting a total of 
4.15 million benefit recipients (Mo, 2004). 
Not only are unemployment insurance benefits lower than the laid-off allowances, but by 
changing their status from that of laid-off employees to that of unemployed persons, employees 
will lose their employment-based social security protection, notably their pensions, medical 
care and housing benefits (China Daily, 21 December 2004). Taken together, a laid-off 
employee can, in theory, receive unemployment benefit support for a total duration of five years 
(three years from the re-employment service centre and two years from the unemployment 
insurance programme). These rather generous provisions reflect the government’s concern to 
provide sufficient support to employees laid off from SOEs. 
The pension system in China is riddled with problems of inadequate funds and narrow 
coverage. Facing a rapidly ageing society, the number of retirees in urban areas will rise from 
48 million in 2004 to 70 million in 2010, and then further to 100 million in 2020. To ensure that 
retirees can receive their benefits promptly, the central government has to subsidise heavily 
those pension funds, managed by local governments (Sin, 2005). In 2003, statistics showed that 
only 45 per cent of urban employees had participated in the retirement insurance programmes 
(China Internet Information Centre, 2004). A nationwide survey in 2000 covering 10,171 older 
urban residents showed that 27 per cent of them were not entitled to pensions. Specifically, 
some 44 per cent of older women and 51 per cent of older people aged over 80 did not have 
pensions. In other words, they have to rely mainly on family support to make ends meet. Even 
among those with pensions, 40 per cent expressed worries about the insufficiency of their 
pension benefits (China Research Centre on Ageing, 2002: 2). Reforms of the medical 
insurance programme, together with the rising costs of medical care, mean rising fee payments 
(Bloom & Tang, 2004; China Daily, 17 January 2005). According to a report from the State 
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Council’s Development Research Centre in 2005, the medical care system and reforms have 
turned medical services into the exclusive privilege of the rich. Some 45 per cent of urban 
residents were not covered by medical insurance programmes (China Network, 2005).  
 With market-oriented reforms in social services, urban residents have to shoulder higher 
expenses on retirement, education, medical care and housing services. With the system of job 
guarantee and the rationing of basic commodities disbanded in the cities, the problem of urban 
poverty has become more critical. Estimates of the size of the urban poor range from 12 million 
to 30 million (Guan, 2003; Tang, sha & Ren, 2003; Zheng, 2003). Estimates by the State 
Statistical Bureau, adopting a poverty line of annual per capita income of 1,875 yuan (US$1 = 
8.08 yuan) in 2000, suggested that 10.5 million people, or 3.1 per cent of the urban population, 
were poverty-stricken (Asian Development Bank, May 2004: 4). In contrast to impressive 
poverty alleviation efforts to reduce the poverty population in the rural areas, urban poverty has 
become more prominent since the 1990s (Asian Development Bank, May 2004; World Bank, 
2004). Unlike in the rural areas, however, the Chinese government has not yet established a 
national poverty line and the actual size of urban poverty remains contested. 
 
The emergence of the urban-based social assistance programme 
Article 45 of the Chinese Constitution recognises the right of the Chinese people to state 
assistance to maintain their basic standard of living. However, for decades, China operated only 
a limited relief programme in the cities, catering mainly for disabled veterans and the ‘three 
nos’. Many of the ‘three nos’ would be received into institutional care, such as homes for the 
aged and orphanages. In addition, the programme also catered for ‘special targets’, including 
redundant workers forced to take early retirement during the period of economic adjustment in 
the early 1960s, victims of political movements, discharged war criminals and old overseas 
Chinese living in China. In 1992, only 190,000 people (0.06 per cent of the urban population) in 
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the whole country received assistance, involving a total of 87.4 million yuan, and the per capita 
benefit was only 38 yuan per month (Tang et al., 2003).  
To re-structure the traditional social assistance programme, the Shanghai government 
extended the coverage, raised the level of benefits and secured financial commitments to the 
programme in 1993. Based on the Shanghai experiences, the Ministry of Civil Affairs 
encouraged other cities in 1994 to adopt the programme. The number of cities that adopted the 
reformed programme increased to 12 in 1995, 116 in 1996, 334 in 1997 and finally covered all 
668 cities in 1999.   
Known as the ‘Minimum Living Standard Guarantee System’ (MLSGS), the means-tested 
programme provides assistance to persons with urban household registration status (around 40 
per cent of the national population). Based on a budget-standard approach, the assistance line is 
calculated according to the minimum standard of living, often based on expenditure surveys of 
low-income households and the financial capacity of the local authority. What a household 
finally receives is the difference between the total benefits eligible (local assistance line times 
the number of persons eligible within the household) and the total household incomes. 
At a subsistence level, the assistance would merely cover basic food and clothing costs, 
and would not take into account rental and medical care (Leung & Wong, 1999). The central 
government issued general guidelines for determining the assistance line at the basic-need level. 
In effect, the assistance lines set up by local governments varied across cities. In principle, the 
assistance line should be below the minimum wage, pensions and unemployment benefits. For 
example, in Beijing the minimum wage per month in 2003 was 490 yuan, unemployment 
insurance benefits were 329-419 yuan, minimum pension benefits were 466 yuan and the 
MLSGS was 290 yuan (Beijing Labour and Social Security Bureau, 2004).   
In 2003, the average national assistance level was 160 yuan per person per month. The 
assistance levels are 200-300 yuan for large coastal cities, 150 yuan for most provincial capitals 
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and 100 yuan for county-level cities (Tang, 2004).5  As such, the highest assistance lines can be 
two to three times greater than the lowest. The discrepancies indicate more the differences in 
the financial capacity of the local governments than differences in the living standards between 
cities. The assistance lines are subject to annual adjustments. From 1993 to 2000, the assistance 
standard of the MLSGS in Shanghai was adjusted nine times, increasing from 120 yuan to 290 
yuan (Shanghai Civil Affairs Bureau, 2004a). Instead of reflecting the changes of consumer 
prices, the adjustments really showed that the assistance line had been started at a very low level. 
On average, the national assistance level in 2003 was only 14 per cent of the average wage and 
23 per cent of the per capita disposable income of urban residents.  
In 2003, the average benefit actually received by a recipient per month was only 55 yuan. 
As expected, the highest payments were found in coastal cities and provinces, such as Beijing 
(231 yuan), Shanghai (138 yuan) and Zhejiang province (113 yuan), and the lowest were in the 
central provinces of Hebei (36 yuan), Wunan (42 yuan) and Henan (43 yuan) (Ministry of Civil 
Affairs, 2004a). Even under the same city administration, there would be geographical 
variations in assistance standards. For example, the assistance levels in Shanghai in 2003 were 
290 yuan in urban districts and 150-183 yuan in rural areas. In practice, the standard can be 
adjusted, with a 20 per cent increase for older persons living alone and a 30 per cent increase for 
the severely disabled. According to Shanghai’s regulations, assistance will be withdrawn 
gradually within a period of two to six months after the recipients have obtained employment or 
received an increase in their incomes (Shanghai Civil Affairs Bureau, 2004ab).  
The 1997 circular issued by the State Council defined the three types of targets covered by 
the programme to include the traditional ‘three nos’; the unemployed whose unemployment 
insurance benefits have been terminated with their total household incomes below the locally 
                                                 
5 At the high end of the provincial cities are Guangzhou (300 yuan), Beijing (290 yuan), Shanghai (290 yuan) and 
Shenzhen (290-344 yuan). At the lower end are Nanchang (143 yuan), Xining (155 yuan) and Guiyang (156 yuan). 
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defined assistance line; and those employees whose working incomes, including pensions and 
allowances, are below the locally defined assistance line (Tang et al., 2003). In the initial years, 
if the applicant or any of his or her family members were an employee of an SOE, then the SOE 
should be responsible for paying the benefits to the eligible applicant. The MLSGS, managed 
by the local civil affairs departments, served only persons who had no SOE connections, 
including those working in bankrupted SOEs. The policy was described as ‘one should take 
care of one’s own baby’. 
To facilitate the development of the programme, each city government has to set up a 
cross-departmental leading group to formulate operational policy and guidelines. Being 
community-based in operation, each applicant has to make his or her application to the local 
residents’ committee. A residents’ committee is a neighbourhood-based mass organisation, 
supervised by the street office, the agency of the district People’s Government.6  An applicant 
has to show all the relevant documents, including household registration card, income receipts 
and household bills.7  The cadres of the residents’ committee would carry out the investigations, 
and make recommendations to the street office and then the district civil affairs bureau for 
approval. After approval, the residents’ committee would be responsible for the delivery of 
benefits, the keeping of records and reviewing the situation of recipients periodically. In such a 
way, the administrative costs of setting up and operating the programme can be kept to a 
minimum. 
                                                 
6 As an extension of the district people’s government, a street office is in charge of the delivery of local public and 
social services, such as family planning, sanitation, social welfare, public health, public security and 
environmental management. On average, it administers a population of around 50,000 residents. Residents’ 
committees comprise members elected by local residents. As elected residents’ representatives, they would 
become government cadres and have to assist the street office to deliver public and social services (Leung, 2000). 
7 An applicant, irrespective of where he or she lives, should apply to the residents’ committee of the street office 
where his or her household registration belongs, and receives the benefits from that street office accordingly. In 
general, the MLSGS is portable, and a recipient can still receive benefits even though he or she has moved to 
another district under the same city administration. 
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According to the regulations, only urban residents with local non-agricultural household 
registration status within an applicant’s household are to be included in the assessment. Spouses 
from the rural areas or from other provinces without local household registration status would 
not be counted in calculating the benefits. Yet monetary incomes from all family members 
living together are included. One of the major problems facing neighbourhood cadres is 
assessing the actual incomes of applicants. Documents indicating incomes are easily subject to 
fraud, and hidden incomes from informal employment are widespread. Therefore, it was a 
common practice in some cities to use the local minimum wage as the income of an able-bodied 
person. Similarly, applicants would be assumed to have those eligible incomes, such as a 
pension and unemployment benefits, rather than what they actually earn (Hong & Wang, 2001; 
Tang et al., 2003). In 2002, the government pledged to eliminate the practice of using ‘assumed 
incomes’ for determining the incomes of applicants.  
In principle, there is no limit to how long a person can receive social assistance benefits. 
One can theoretically receive the benefits as long as one needs to. In practice, however, only 
persons who are unable to work are provided with long-term assistance. Others are provided 
only with short-term benefits subject to regular review for continuation. Those who are able to 
work must register at employment agencies for jobs and retraining. They cannot reject job 
offers. Failure to do so will lead to their benefits being terminated. The unemployed have to 
participate in voluntary community work, ranging from 10 to 40 hours per month. Extension of 
assistance is conditional on the satisfactory participation in community work (Ministry of Civil 
Affairs, 1999; Li, 2004). 
At the level of the street office, there is a MLSGS committee comprising party secretary, 
police, neighbourhood cadres and residents’ representatives to process applications, review 
cases and supervise community service placements. To facilitate ‘public monitoring’ of the 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
 
 14
situation of recipients, the names of the recipients and the amount of benefits received are made 
public on neighbourhood bulletin boards on three occasions: during the initial application, at 
the initial assessment, and during the final approval periods. Cadres can also interview 
neighbours to collect information on the living standards and life style of the applicants. Life 
styles that include such things as eating in restaurants, wearing jewellery, owning of pets and 
having mobile phones are considered unacceptable (Tang, 2004). In some cities, families who 
have violated the one-child policy regulations are not eligible (Guangzhou People’s 
Government, 2004). To the West, this practice violates individual rights. But to the Chinese 
government, it is a necessary means of preventing fraud, so that assistance is given only to the 
deserving poor.  
In financing the programme, the initial arrangement before 1999 was for the local 
governments to cover all expenses. In practice, there were different patterns of cost-sharing 
between the city and district governments. Yet with the budget constraints of local governments, 
the size of beneficiaries and the level of assistance were largely dependent on the financial 
capacity and commitment of the provincial and city governments to support the programmes 
(Tang et al., 2003; Yu, 2002). The crux of the problem is how to ensure that local governments 
can cover the mounting expenditures.  
To supplement the MLSGS, specific supplementary benefits have been developed in rich 
cities such as Shanghai, Beijing and Guangzhou. To cope with the problem of high inflation in 
the early 1990s, Shanghai introduced the food-stamp programme in 1994. Low-income 
families and MLSGS recipients were able to obtain free grain, edible oil and sugar from 
designated stores. In-kind assistance comprised two types of schemes. The ‘Blue Card’ Scheme 
provided supplementary assistance (around 40 yuan per month) to persons already receiving the 
MLSGS, while the ‘Green Card’ Scheme (around 30 yuan per month) provided assistance to 
low-income families whose incomes were slightly above the MLSGS standards. The two 
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‘cards’ were combined together in 1999, and food rationing was replaced by cash assistance. In 
2003, a total of 130,000 people, of the 0.45 million MLSGS recipients (4.5 per cent of the 
population), received the benefits (Shanghai Civil Affairs Bureau, 2004a).  
In Shanghai, limited and means-tested medical aid (a maximum of 5,000 yuan a year), 
educational aid (tuition exemption or reduction and scholarships for excellent students) and 
housing aid (low cost public housing units and rental assistance) were provided. But 
educational and housing aids were managed by separate government authorities. The coverage 
of these programmes is limited. In 2003, 58,200 hospitalisation payments were made, with an 
average of 1,089 yuan for each payment (Shanghai Civil Affairs Bureau, 2004a). In Beijing, 
among the 120,000 MLSGS recipients in 2002, only 4,000 people received medical assistance 
(Li, 2004).  
Lastly, local charity bodies and trade unions, mobilised by the government, provide cash 
or in-kind assistance in education, medical service, food and training to recipients of the 
MLSGS. But the development of NGOs as charity businesses is still rudimentary and 
government-led.  
 
Phenomenal expansion of the programme 
In 1999, the government had pledged to further expand the MLSGS for three major reasons. 
First, the problem of laid-off employees had become critical. The government issued a policy 
directive to strengthen the ‘three social protection lines’, namely the allowances for the laid-off 
employees, unemployment insurance and the MLSGS. The MLSGS can provide a safety net as 
a last resort for the unemployed who are not entitled to unemployment assistance or whose 
unemployment assistance has expired. In 1999, it was estimated that about 10 per cent of those 
eligible for laid-off assistance did not receive their entitled allowances (Leung, 2003). Likewise, 
because of the inability to make contributions by loss-making SOEs, some pensioners were 
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unable to receive their payments. Meanwhile, the government is determined to abolish the 
policy of ‘one should take care of one’s own baby’. Local governments are to assume full 
responsibility for providing financial assistance to needy state employees. 
Second, to celebrate the 50th anniversary of the People’s Republic of China in 1999, the 
benefit levels of unemployment insurance, the MLSGS and laid-off allowances were raised by 
30 per cent (Tang et al., 2003). With the raising of the assistance line, more people became 
eligible for assistance, so expenditures on the programmes inevitably escalated. The central 
government provided local governments with 400 million yuan to cover 80 per cent of the 
increased expenditures. Seven economically prosperous coastal provinces had to cover the 
increases themselves (Tang et al., 2003). 
Third, even though the number of recipients had reached over four million by 1999, 
estimates based on the local assistance lines showed that the number of people eligible for 
assistance in reality had reached 14.8 million. Therefore, the programme caters to only about 27 
per cent of the poverty-stricken population. Not surprisingly, the economically well-off cities 
and provinces could cover basically all the persons eligible for assistance. Western and central 
provinces still had a large proportion of eligible people who were not covered (Tang et al., 
2003). The low coverage was mainly attributed to the widespread shortage of funds among 
local governments.   
Against this background, the central government put pressure on local government to 
extend the coverage. As a result, the number of recipients jumped from four million in 2000 to 
11.7 million in 2001, and further to 20.7 million in 2002. The phenomenal increases in the 
number of recipients indicated that the central government was determined to extend the 
programme to cover all those who are eligible. By the end of 2003, the total number of 
recipients reached 22.47 million, representing 4.2 per cent of the urban population, as compared 
with only 1.4 per cent in 2000 (Ministry of Civil Affairs, 2004a). 
 
 17
Understanding the uneven development and the financial difficulties of local governments, 
the Chinese government readily assumed the responsibility to provide funding support to this 
programme to extend the coverage and to ensure that those who are eligible should receive 
assistance. Thereafter, the financial commitment from the central government soared 
substantially from only 0.4 billion yuan in 1999 (26 per cent of the total expenditures) to 9.2 
billion yuan (61 per cent of the total expenditures) in 2003. (Table 1) Seven more prosperous 
provinces and metropolises, including Guangdong, Jiangsu and Zhejiang, Shanghai and Beijing, 
do not receive any subsidies from central government. The proportion of subsidies varies 
significantly from 16 per cent for Fujian Province in the coastal area to over 70 per cent in 
Gansu and Guizhou Provinces in the west. Also, contributions from different levels of 
government, namely the provincial, city and county levels, vary as they lack a standardised 
formula. In principle, subsidies from the central government are to take into consideration the 
total number of recipients and the financial capacity of the local governments. In terms of the 
absolute amount, provinces in the rusty industrial belt in northeastern China, namely Liaoning, 
Heilongjiang and Jilin, received the largest central government subsidies. Altogether, these 
three provinces had over 4.6 million MLSGS recipients in 2003 (Ministry of Civil Affairs, 
2004a). Indeed, these provinces have the highest concentration of loss-making national SOEs. 
With rising contribution from the central government, the absolute amount of contribution 
from the provincial and city governments has declined from 6.26 billion yuan in 2002 to 5.9 
billion yuan in 2003 (Table 1). Using Sichuan Province as an example, the proportions of 
contribution from central, provincial and city governments were 30.8 per cent, 5.8 per cent and 
63.3 per cent, respectively, in 1999. As the expenditures increased sixfold from 1999 to 2002, 
the percentages changed to 62.8 per cent, 9.9 per cent and 27.3 per cent, respectively, in 2002 (Ji, 
2002). 
Table 1 in about here 
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Overall, the dramatic increases in the number of recipients and expenditure in the early 2000s 
were due to continuous massive layoffs from SOEs, gradual closure of re-employment centres, 
the abolishment of the policy of ‘one should take care of one’s own baby’, the use of actual 
incomes in eligibility assessment and subsidies from the central government. Even with 
increasing support from the central government, the demands on local governments, 
particularly central provinces, to finance the programmes are still heavy. With an increased 
number of recipients, the management structure and staffing of the programme at the 
community level have been over-stretched. 
 
Profile of recipients 
With mounting subsidies, the central government found that it was necessary to have a closer 
understanding of the demands and monitor how the funds were being used. In March 2002, 
inspection teams from the Ministry of Civil Affairs were sent to provinces to check on the 
figures for the number of people eligible for assistance but who failed to receive assistance, the 
financial commitment from local governments and the information management system of the 
programme. The national audit indicated that the programme covered a total of 13.9 million 
recipients with 5.4 million people being expected to receive assistance soon. Among the 
beneficiaries, 49.5 per cent were without jobs, 9.8 per cent had insufficient incomes, 30.2 per 
cent were their family members, 4.8 per cent were retirees and 5.7 per cent belonged to the 
traditional ‘three nos’ (Yang, 2002). As such, this programme serves mainly people facing 
inadequate income protection due to unemployment, low wages and old age. These people are 
considered the ‘new urban poor’ (Guan, 2003; Hussain, 2003). Different from the ‘old urban 
poor’, the majority of the ‘new urban poor’ are able to work. A study of the recipient profile in 
five major cities by the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences in 2003 found that 53 per cent 
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were unemployed persons, 9 per cent were employed, 26 per cent were children and 12 per cent 
were older people, chronically sick or disabled (Tang, 2004). 
To further understand the background of the recipients and the operations of the 
programmes, the Ministry of Civil Affairs embarked on a sample survey of 10,000 recipient 
households, receiving 6,505 returned questionnaires in September 2002. The study sought 
information on the profile of the recipients, how and when they received their benefits, and 
perceived difficulties encountered (Ministry of Civil Affairs, 2003). The findings showed that 
56 per cent of the households had two or three persons. About 34 per cent of them had disabled 
persons, and 64.9 per cent had chronically sick members in their family. Some 62 per cent of the 
respondents had monthly MLSGS benefits of less than 100 yuan and 30 per cent per cent 
between 101 and 200 yuan. In terms of payment arrangements, 60 per cent of them received 
their payments monthly, 29 per cent quarterly and 3 per cent half-yearly. Some 90 per cent of 
them received payments promptly and 91 per cent of them received their full payment. They 
received their payments mainly through the street offices. Most of them regarded job-seeking, 
medical care and education expenses as the major difficulties they encountered. 
The survey indicated that the delivery of the programme involved some inconsistencies in 
terms of prompt and full payment of benefits and that the benefits received were low. Similar to 
many other places, poverty in China is often associated with disabilities and poor health (Chen, 
Lucas & Gong, 2004). Besides financial and medical care assistance, they need employment 
support. More importantly, there is a lack of a comprehensive and unified data set at the 
national level on the overall profile of the recipients, including their age and sex distribution, 
family structure, duration of receiving the benefits and problems encountered. 
 
An appraisal 
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Given the phenomenal increases in the number of recipients in 2002 and 2003, the essential 
question is whether the number will continue to increase. The monthly figures in 2004 showed 
that the number had increased to a peak of 22.6 million recipients in the first quarter, and then 
declined gradually to around 22 million in the last quarter (Ministry of Civil Affairs, 2004a). 
Despite its widened coverage, the scheme still excludes those without local urban household 
registration status, notably migrant workers. It is estimated that there are around 100 million 
rural migrants working in cities, and they oftentimes face the common plight of failing to 
receive their wages promptly (Mo, 2004; Solinger, 1999). Given the Chinese government’s 
intention to eventually abolish the household registration system, rural migrants with a stable 
job and source of income as well as a permanent address should be granted residential status 
(Zhou, 2004).  When more rural migrants have residential status, it will be more difficult to 
exclude them from the programme.  
Operationally, the programme has relied too much on the community administrative 
structure to deliver the services. This has the advantage that it can keep administrative costs low 
and operations flexible. Yet under a decentralised administrative and delivery system with loose 
operational guidelines, individual neighbourhood cadres vary greatly in how they interpret and 
apply the guidelines. As popularly elected residents’ representatives, neighbourhood cadres are 
not professionally trained to administer the programme. There is a lack of systematic and 
standardised procedures to handle investigations and to make arrangements for job referrals, 
training and voluntary community work. The programme system also does not incorporate an 
effective system of appeal. The whole application and review process may be affected by the 
personal relationships between the neighbourhood cadres and the applicants or recipients. To be 
sure, the process of publicising the names of the applicants, involving neighbours in the 
investigation process and using informal mechanisms, such as checking on life styles and 
consumption patterns to determine eligibility is subject to corruption and manipulation. 
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Furthermore, ‘voluntary’ community work for recipients, such as garbage collection and street 
cleaning, is carried out within the neighbourhood where they live. Again, this is a very 
stigmatising practice that needs to be reviewed. 
 Besides programme administration, the effectiveness of the social assistance programme 
is largely dependent on the coordination between different benefits, notably employment, 
housing, medical care and education services. Since the majority of the recipients are 
able-bodied and have the ability to work, the priority of the social assistance programme should 
be to facilitate and motivate their re-employment and re-entry into the labour market. The Civil 
Affairs Departments in charge of the policy and operation of the programme as well as the 
community-based delivery system do not specialise in job creation, training and referrals. The 
effectiveness of the current system in handling re-employment is in doubt (Ge, 2004). As in 
many other welfare states, the core concern of the Chinese social assistance programme is how 
to avoid welfare dependency and design a more effective employment-oriented, activation or 
‘workfare’ approach to social assistance (OECD, 2005). The availability of medical and 
educational support is of paramount importance to alleviate the plight of the poor. Currently, 
these benefits are only established in a limited way in large cities.    
Even though the number of recipients has stabilised, the expenditures will continue to soar. 
Improvements in the basic assistance level and other supplementary benefits will further burden 
the local governments. The crux of the problem is how to ensure those financially less 
developed provinces have the sufficient resources to support the programme. Most likely, the 
central government will have to shoulder the staggering responsibility of financing this 
programme. 
The over-reliance on the government to tackle poverty is largely due to the 
under-development of non-governmental organisations in China. By 2003, there were around 
1,200 charity foundations in China engaging in the field of poverty alleviation, education and 
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environmental protection. They have rather limited total assets of five billion yuan (China 
Daily, 20 March 2004). A survey of non-governmental organisations in China showed that their 
development is hindered by a lack of a public donation culture, dominating control from the 
government and weak leadership (Deng, 2001).  
A study carried out in Hubei province in 2002 revealed that most of the urban residents 
accepted that it was an obligation of the government to help the poor. But only 66 per cent of the 
people had heard about the MLSGS. Some 26 per cent of the recipients perceived MLSGS 
benefits as shameful. Only 23 per cent would not agree to have their names made public by the 
government. In the event of disputes over the MLSGS benefits, some 70 per cent of the 
recipients would appeal to their work unit administrators for assistance (Lin, Chang & Yan, 
2004). 
 As a core social security programme, it provides nationwide basic protection to 
poverty-stricken urban residents. It is to be hoped that the programme will be extended to 
include migrant workers and villagers. To be effective, the programme has to be supplemented 
by other social assistance benefits, notably in housing, employment, medical care and 
education. The decentralised delivery system has to be reviewed to improve the standardisation 
of assistance levels and eligibility criteria. Facing the conflict of roles as elected residents’ 
representatives and programme staff, non-professionally trained neighbourhood cadres are not 
suitable to administer the programme. The need to respect and protect the privacy rights of 
recipients should be considered. Financial support, particularly for poorly developed cities, 
should be ensured through clearly defined roles and responsibilities for the central and local 
governments. To improve the policy and the programme, the data management system must 
first be improved, and more research must be conducted on the needs of the recipients and the 
effectiveness of the programme in poverty alleviation. 
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Conclusion 
In summary, the emerging social assistance programme in China is administratively 
decentralised and community-based. Even though it is designed as a right-based programme, 
local and neighbourhood governments have substantial discretion to determine eligibility and 
entitlements. The programme caters to a mixed group of low-income people, including the 
unemployed, older people, the sick and the disabled. All benefits are means-tested, stringent, 
low level and heavily stigmatised. Complementary support in housing, medical care, education, 
employment and personal social services is largely under-developed, inadequate and not 
institutionalised. The role of private charity is extremely limited. With these features, Chinese 
social assistance does not seem to fit neatly into any one of the typologies of social assistance 
regimes categorised by Gough et al. (1997). Accordingly, it is still premature to group the 
Chinese social welfare system conceptually together with those of other countries (White, 
1998). 
Urban poverty has been aggravated by the rising layoffs and costs of social services, 
including medical care, education and housing. In addition, the emergence of the social 
assistance programme in China was triggered by the increasing inability of the 
employment-based social security system to meet the challenges of persistent unemployment 
and an ageing population. With the declining importance of employment-based welfare, local 
governments are expected to gradually take on the responsibility. Yet a welfare system financed 
by local government needs time to evolve. Now the top priority of development has shifted 
away from the ‘universal’ social insurance programmes towards the establishment and 
consolidation of the residual social assistance system in the cities.  
Overall, social welfare reform is more guided by pragmatic concerns than by a clear 
visionary direction and a comprehensive developmental blueprint. Reforms are incremental 
and piecemeal, rather than employing a ‘shock therapy’ approach based on introducing radical 
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changes. Assuming the role of macro-control at the top, the central government delineates 
broad guiding principles for reforms. These reforms are indicative rather than mandatory and 
universal. At the local level, governments are encouraged to experiment with different solutions 
and models according to local circumstances and financial capacity. Meanwhile, policy 
adjustments are made based on learning from research studies and advices from international 
organisations and consultants. After some years of continuous experimentation and evaluation, 
the government, often through legislation, is attempting to unify diversified practices by 
promoting one of the more successful models. The strength of this approach is that it can 
minimise resistance and facilitate readjustments through feedbacks from programme 
implementation. The shortcoming is that regional disparities in social welfare development are 
substantial. Given the decentralised and segmented social welfare system, access and 
entitlement to social services and social security benefits is primarily differentiated among 
occupational groups, economic sectors and geographical regions. In effect, an underclass of the 
‘new poor’ made up of the unemployed, rural migrants, and the sick and disabled has emerged 
in the cities.  
In the absence of a compensatory social and economic policy, both market-oriented 
economic and social insurance reforms have inevitably exacerbated the tendency towards 
inequality in the distribution of income. In 2000, the Gini coefficient reached 0.397 (Khan & 
Riskin, 2001: 7). Growing income disparities threaten social stability (Perry & Sheldon, 2000). 
The threat of social unrest is imminent given mounting corruption, unemployment, poverty and 
income disparity.  
In the end, the MLSGS, a residual and means-tested social security programme, has 
emerged as an integral part of the social protection system, filling the gaps created by the 
reforms in the social insurance programmes. It has performed the vital role of facilitating 
economic reforms and maintaining social stability through offering protection to the 
 
 25
unemployed and laid-off employees. The development of this social assistance programme also 
reflects the need to reform the largely inefficient and ineffective housing and medical care 
programmes for the low-income population. On the other hand, in order to build a coherent 
social welfare system for China, there is an urgent need to review the country’s overall social 
protection system. 
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Table 1. Number of MLSGS recipients and expenditures over the years. 
Year Total number of 
recipients in millions of 
people (% increase over 
previous year) 
Total expenditures in 
billion yuan 
Contribution from 
central government in 
billion yuan (%) 
1997   2.00   1.15  
1998   2.34 (17%)   1.20  
1999   2.66 (13.7%)   1.54  
2000   4.03 (51.5%)   2.96  0.8 (27%) 
2001 11.70 (190.3%)   5.42  2.3 (42.4%) 
2002 20.65 (76.5%) 10.86  4.6 (42.4%) 
2003 22.47 (8.8%) 15.10  9.2 (60.9%) 
Source: Ministry of Civil Affairs (2005ab). 
 
 
